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How much might human capital policies affect earnings inequalities 
and poverty?
¿Cuánto afectan las políticas en capital humano a la desigualdad del ingreso 
y a la pobreza?
Jere R. Behrman*
Abstract
Economic inequality and poverty have persisted in Latin America despite important 
changes in political and policy regimes.  This paper explores the relationship 
between various human capital programs aimed to reduced poverty and how 
improvements of those in poverty in the left tail of the earning income distribution 
are likely to reduce inequality.  First it reviews some recent benefit/cost estimates 
for human capital intervention in LAC, suggesting some investments in which the 
returns appear quite high. Then it turns over to how much increases in schooling 
attainment targeted to the poor would reduce poverty and income inequality. This 
is illustrated empirically using the 2004 Chilean Social Protection Survey data. 
Alternative simulations suggest significant impacts of well targeted increases 
in schooling attainment on reducing poverty and inequality.
Key words: Inequality, Poverty, Human capital..
Resumen
La desigualdad económica y la pobreza han persistido en América Latina a 
pesar de importantes cambios en los regímenes políticos y en la política social. 
Este artículo explora la relación entre diversos programas de capital humano Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 10
destinados a reducir la pobreza y cómo una reducción de la pobreza tiende a 
reducir la desigualdad. En primer lugar, se presentan estimaciones de costo/
beneficio recientes de distintas intervenciones en  capital humano en América 
Latina, sugiriendo que en algunas de estas inversiones los rendimientos parecen 
bastante altos. Luego, se profundiza en cómo un aumento en la escolaridad   
de las personas en situación de pobreza reduciría los niveles de pobreza y la 
desigualdad de ingresos. Para ilustrar empíricamente este punto se utilizan 
los datos de la ronda 2004 de la Encuesta de Protección Social de Chile. 
Simulaciones alternativas sugieren un impacto significativo del  aumento en 
los años de escolaridad, focalizados en personas pobres, en la reducción de la 
pobreza y la desigualdad.
Palabras clave: Desigualdad, Pobreza, Capital humano.
JEL Classification: I24, I3, J24.
As is well-known, economic inequality long has been relatively high in most 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in comparison with most other areas 
of the world. These inequalities generally have persisted despite some variations 
due to changes in political and policy regimes and markets and significant policy 
innovations in recent decades in LAC countries from Chile to Mexico.
At the start of the 1970s, for example, LAC income inequality measured by 
the income Gini coefficient ranged from a low of 0.43 in Argentina and Uruguay, 
to a high of 0.62 in Honduras (Table 1). Average income inequality in the region 
as a whole for this period was 0.53 compared with 0.36 for high-income OECD 
countries, and 0.43 for East Asia. Schooling inequality was also high in Latin 
America in the early 1970s, with the schooling attainment Gini coefficients 
averaging 0.46. The countries with the highest schooling inequality were also 
some of the poorest in the region (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador). In contrast, Argentina and Chile were well below the LAC average 
on both measures. The average LAC income Gini coefficient subsequently 
declined to 0.50 in the early 1980s but increased to about 0.54 in 2000, though 
the Gini coefficient for schooling attainment stayed at about 0.46 for 1980 and 
then declined somewhat to about 0.42 in 2000.
Conceptually distinct from the question about inequality is the question of 
poverty. Most governments profess an interest in reducing poverty and have 
undertaken programs that purportedly are directed towards doing so. In the short 
run, transfers to the poor are often thought to be among the more effective ways 
of reducing short-run poverty, though such transfers might be conditional on 
activities such as work in employment programs in order to screen beneficiaries 
or to limit negative effects on labor supplies. In the longer run, investments in 
human resources of the poor are usually thought to be among the most effective 
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enhancing their human resources is likely to increase the return to the use of their 
time. In recent years in LAC, for example, there has been considerable expan-
sion of conditional cash transfer programs based on the Mexican PROGRESA/
Oportunidades example in which the transfers are conditional on indicators of 
investments in human capital, most notably in schooling attainment (but also 
on investments in health and nutrition)1. Feasible improvements in the positions 
of those in poverty in the left tail of the earnings income distribution, of course, 
are likely to reduce inequality.
This paper first considers some recent benefit/cost estimates for human 
capital interventions in LAC (Section 1). These suggest that there are some 
human capital investments in which the estimated returns appear quite high. 
Then the paper turns to rough calculations of how much increases in schooling 
attainment– the most emphasized form of human capital investments –targeted 
towards the poorer members of society will reduce poverty and income inequali-
ties (Section 2). To illustrate the empirical orders of magnitude, earnings and 
wage rate function estimates and the distribution of earnings from the 2004 
Chilean Social Protection Survey are used. Section 3 then concludes regarding 
the implications of the previous two sections for the possibility of using human 
capital investments to reduce poverty and inequality in LAC.
1.  Benefit/Cost Estimates for Human Capital Investments
  in Latin America
There is a surprising paucity of good estimates of benefit/cost estimates for 
human capital interventions in Latin America and in other developing regions. 
This is in important part because of the difficulties in making good estimates2. 
On the benefit side, for example, there often are difficulties in:
•	 Obtaining good estimates of important impacts given behavioral choices in 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneities (so that, for example, schooling 
is not incorrectly credited in part with the effects of unobserved abilities, 
motivations and family background that in part cause more schooling and 
also directly affect outcomes that might be directly affected by schooling) 
and that impacts may be distributed over many decades over the life cycle;
•	 Placing values on all the relevant impacts so that they can be aggregated, 
which is particularly difficult (e.g., for adverted mortality) but also difficult 
1  There are a number of studies that report positive impact of these programs on schooling, 
nutrition and other outcomes (e.g., Behrman and Hoddinott (2005); Behrman, Parker 
and Todd (2009a,b); Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005); Fiszbein and Schady (2009); 
Gertler (2004); Hoddinott and Adato (2009); Rivera et al. (2004); Schultz (2004).
2  For discussion in much more detail of these difficulties and some illustrative estimates 
of benefit/cost ratios for developing countries, including some in LAC, see Behrman, 
Alderman and Hoddinott (2004) and Knowles and Behrman (2004, 2005).How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 13
if projects are large enough to have impact on market prices or if prices are 
very distorted by market or policy failures;
•	 Selecting appropriate discount rates to permit aggregation across time 
(Table 2 illustrates how much the choice of discounting matters, as well as 
that impacts of human capital investments depend on life-cycle patterns in 
survival probabilities); and
•	 Distinguishing between private and social (beyond the private) benefits, a 
distinction that is central for the efficiency motive for policies.
TABLE 2
PDV OF $ 1000 RECEIVED WITH VARIOUS LAGS STARTING FROM BIRTH AT 
ALTERNATIVE DISCOUNT RATES, ADJUSTED FOR SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES*
Discount Rate 3.00% 5.00% 10.00% Survival Prob
Lag in years    
10 $ 717 $ 592 $ 372 0.964
40 $ 281 $ 130 $   20 0.915
60 $ 134 $   42 $     3 0.787
100 1 0 0 0.007
Survival probabilities based on WHO Life Tables for Brazil at http://www.who.int/countries.
On the cost side, there often are difficulties in:
•	 Identifying the true private and public resource costs (not the governmental 
budgetary costs), including distortion costs but excluding transfers;
•	 Assessing the costs when a project is scaled-up, including not only the pos-
sibility of changing marginal costs at a micro level but changing marginal 
resource costs through impacts on markets; and
•	 Distinguishing between private and social costs, again important for efficiency 
considerations.
However there are some recent estimates of benefit/cost ratios for human 
capital investments in developing countries that attempt to deal with some of 
these problems –but at the same time illustrate some of the problems. Sections 
1.1 summarizes selected estimates for educational interventions in LAC and 
Section 1.2 summarizes selected estimates for nutrition/health interventions 
with adjustments to place them in a LAC context.
1.1.  Benefit/Cost Estimates for Three Recent LAC Education-Related 
Programs
If education means learning, then education is a life-long process –and not 
limited to schooling though at times the literature inappropriately seems to 
equate education with schooling. Recent estimates of adult cognitive achieve-
ment production functions in Guatemala, for example, illustrate that assuming Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 14
only schooling matters in the production of adult cognitive skills leads to a 
substantial overestimates of the impact of schooling and underestimates of the 
importance of pre- and post-schooling experiences (Behrman et al. (2008)). In 
part for this reason, I here summarize three interventions – one pre-school, one 
related to schooling, and one post-schooling.
1.1.1.  Bolivian PIDI (Proyecto Integral de Desarrollo Infantil) Pre-School 
Program3
Program: PIDI provided daycare, nutritional, and educational services to children 
between the ages of 6 months and 72 months who lived in poor, predominantly 
urban areas. The goals were to improve health and early cognitive/social deve-
lopment by providing children with better nutrition, adequate supervision, and 
stimulating environments. It was hoped that the program also eased the transition 
to elementary school, improved progression through elementary grades, and 
raised school performance, all of which were expected to increase post-school 
productivity. Through PIDI, children attended full-time child care centers located 
in the homes of women living in low-income areas targeted by the program. 
These women were given training in child care and loans and grants (up to $ 500) 
to upgrade facilities in their homes. Each PIDI center had up to 15 children and 
approximately one staff member per five children, with additional staff provided 
when there was a larger proportion of infants. The program provided food to 
supply 70% of the children’s nutritional needs as well as health and nutrition 
monitoring and educational activity programs.
Program benefits: Longitudinal information is available on a sample of pro-
gram participants, a sample of other children in the same age range living in 
program areas and a sample of children in the same age range living in roughly 
comparable areas that did not have the program. This includes information on 
pre-school child anthropometrics, cognitive development and psychosocial de-
velopment. However baseline pre-program data on critical child attributes (e.g., 
anthropometrics) are not available. Based on a dynamic model of investing in 
children, a range of estimation methods were used to assess the robustness of 
estimated program impacts under alternative assumptions about the selection into 
the program –standard cross-sectional regressions, propensity score matching 
with the two samples of children not in the program, and marginal propensity 
score matching (with the advantage of controlling for unobserved factors that 
determined program participation) focusing on changes in the outcomes with 
different program exposures and conditional on child age when entering the 
program. The estimates show that the program significantly increased cognitive 
achievement and psychosocial test scores, especially for children who participated 
in the program for at least seven months. The impact estimates are fairly robust 
to the use of alternative comparison groups and estimators. Estimates obtained 
by the marginal matching estimator tend to be larger, particularly at longer du-
rations and for children aged 6-36 months, than those obtained using traditional 
econometric estimators that impose stronger functional form assumptions.
3  Based on Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004).How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 15
To obtain the program benefits, the impacts of these pre-school characteristics 
need to be translated in the value of their impact on lifetime productivity. Four 
channels through which the preschool program can affect lifetime earnings are 
considered: (1) increasing cognitive skills as an adult (conditional on grades 
completed), which directly affects earnings, (2) increasing physical stature as 
an adult, which directly affects earnings, (3) increasing the number of grades 
completed, which directly affects earnings and the age of school completion, 
and (4) decreasing the age of school completion without changing the number 
of grades completed. Available data from Bolivia are used for some dimensions 
of these processes, such as grade repetition, distribution of completed schooling 
attainment and related earnings. In the absence of estimates from Bolivia on 
other needed components, estimates from previous studies on other developing 
countries are used (e.g., Thomas and Strauss’ (1997) estimate of the relationship 
between adult earnings and height in Brazil, the Alderman et al. (1996) estimate 
of the cognitive skills– earnings relationship in Pakistan) under the assumption 
that increases in height and cognitive ability as a child have persistent effects that 
translate into equiproportional increases as an adult. This last assumption may 
result in an overstatement of the impacts. On the other hand, in some respects 
these estimates probably understate the program benefits because (1) they do 
not incorporate non-labor-market effects such as increased productivity in the 
production of health and nutrition and (2) they do not incorporate the value of 
time gained through less time in childcare of the children’s mothers or other 
caregivers due to the program.
Program costs: The program cost was estimated by Ruiz (1996) to have been 
approximately $ 43 per beneficiary per month, which is substantial in a country 
where per capita annual GDP at the time was $ 800 in exchange-rate-converted 
pesos, or $ 2540 in purchasing power parity terms. Approximately 40% of 
the expenditure went to the nutritional component of the program. This study 
uses the Ruiz estimate, with an adjustment in alternative estimates of 25% for 
the distortion cost of raising revenues for the program (e.g., see Knowles and 
Behrman 2004). Such estimates may overstate somewhat the costs if part of 
the nutritional supplementation for the children effectively was a transfer that 
replaced food that the children otherwise would have been provided by their 
families, as suggested by some previous studies.4
Benefit/cost ratios: Table 3 summarizes the estimated benefit/cost ratios with 
alternative assumptions concerning discount rates (3% and 5%), schooling levels, 
and whether distortion costs are included. The included estimates range from 1.4 
to 3.7, all of which mean that the program has benefits greater than its costs, but 
the range indicates considerable sensitivity to the alternative assumptions.
4  Alternatively, the benefits are underestimated because they in part are reaped by other 
household members.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 16
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Intermediate  (8) 1224 1352 1394 5107 3.7 1301 3230 2.5
Secondary  (11) 1422 1550 1394 3969 2.9 1301 2232 1.7
Intermediate  (8) 1224 1352 1743 5107 2.9 1626 3230 2.0
Secondary  (11) 1422 1550 1743 3069 2.3 1626 2232 1.4
*  Assumes that children participate in program for three years starting at age 2. Impact: shortens 
time to complete schooling by 1 year; increases schooling level by 1 grade; increases cogni-
tive skills by 5%. Costs in first two rows are $ 516 per year based on Ruiz (1996); costs in the 
second two rows also include a 25% adjustment for distortions due to raising public revenues 
for the program. 
1.1.2.  Colombian Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación 
Secundaria (PACES) Scholarship Program for Poor Urban Secondary 
School Students5
Program: The Colombian government created the PACES voucher program for 
poor secondary school–age children in 1991 to enable them to attend private 
secondary schools. By 1996, the program was covering about 100,000 students. 
At the time the program was launched, enrollment in primary school (covering 
grades 1-5) was almost universal, while the enrollment rate in secondary school 
(i.e., covering grades 6-11) was 73% overall and 55% for the poorest quintile 
of students. The vouchers were designed to cover about one-half of the cost of 
private secondary schools. They could be renewed as long as students maintai-
ned satisfactory academic performance. The vouchers were targeted to children 
residing in poor urban residential areas and who previously had attended public 
primary schools.
Program benefits: The PACES scholarship program (and scholarship programs 
generally) might be expected to have the following effects:
•	 Increased schooling attainment (however, there may be negative effects via 
school crowding).
•	 Earlier completion of given schooling levels.
•	 Improved cognitive achievement for a given level of schooling attainment 
(assuming that private schools attended by some voucher recipients provided 
5  Based on Angrist et al. (2002) as summarized in Knowles and Behrman (2004).How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 17
better-quality schooling than that provided by the public schools that would 
have been attended in the absence of the vouchers).
•	 Reduced work effort by other family members (any reduction in work effort 
by the scholarship recipient is considered to be part of the opportunity cost 
of schooling).
Evaluation of the PACES program was facilitated by the fact that vouchers 
were initially awarded by lottery in municipalities in which the number of stu-
dents applying for vouchers exceeded the estimated shortfall in the number of 
spaces available in public schools that was used by local authorities to decide 
how many new vouchers to make available in a given school year. This in effect 
created a “natural experiment” that made it possible to estimate the effect of the 
vouchers on the target population much as one could do if the voucher scheme 
had been conducted as a randomized experiment6, 7.
This evaluation did not find any significant impact on enrollment. However, 
it did find that lottery winners were 15 percent more likely to attend a private 
school8. After three years, lottery winners also had completed 0.12-0.16 more 
grades of schooling (primarily due to lower repetition rates) and were about 10 
percentage points more likely to have completed the 8th grade at the end of the 
program’s third year. Although the program had no effect on dropout rates, lottery 
winners scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on standardized tests. In addition, 
lottery winners reported working 2.2 hours per week less than non-winners and 
were less likely to be either married or cohabiting as teenagers (however, this 
last difference affected only about one percent of the sample).
The evaluation study estimates that the additional 0.12-0.16 grades of school-
ing completed by lottery winners would raise their annual incomes by about 
$ 36-48 per year (based on an estimated rate of return to schooling of 10 percent 
in Colombia and predicted average annual earnings of $ 3,000).
6  The implicit assumption is that the excess demand for vouchers occurred randomly across 
municipalities (and therefore was not associated with other municipality-level factors that 
might affect education). If, for example, excess demand for vouchers more likely occurred 
where recent expectations were higher regarding the returns to schooling because of greater 
economic activity than elsewhere, the estimated impacts may not be applicable to other 
municipalities with lower expectations regarding the returns to schooling. Unfortunately, 
the study does not provide information with which to assess whether the “excess-demand” 
municipalities were similar to or different from other municipalities.
7  In fact, the evaluation found that only about 90% of lottery winners actually used their 
vouchers, while about 24% of lottery users received scholarships from other sources. To 
correct for the effects of such “contamination”, the evaluation also used lottery success as 
an instrument to predict whether a given youth received a scholarship. The instrumental 
variable estimates of the grade completion effect were about 50% greater than the “reduced-
form” OLS estimates of being a lottery winner. The estimates of effectiveness used in the 
published study to obtain the cost-benefit estimates are the reduced-form estimates. In 
this case, the presumably more accurate instrumental variable estimates arguably should 
have been used.
8  Because of the reported poor quality in some of the new secondary schools that emerged 
to serve voucher recipients, eligibility to participate in the program was limited to not-
for-profit schools from 1996 on. Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 18
Program costs: The economic cost of the PACES program includes:
•	 Additional schooling costs (some of which may be incurred directly by 
households, including the opportunity cost of the additional time scholarship 
students are engaged in schooling-related activities).
•	 Program administration costs.
•	 Distortionary costs related to the financing of the program (e.g., the dead-
weight cost of collecting the necessary taxes to finance the program) or 
to reduced work effort on the part of other household members (due to a 
possible income effect).
The costs of scholarship programs do not include the cost of the scholar-
ships themselves (i.e., the cost of the voucher, in the PACES program), which 
is a transfer.
Table 4 summarizes information on the costs of the PACES program as re-
ported in the evaluation study. The table indicates that the reported social costs 
of the program (the last column in the table) are at least US$ 195 per lottery 
winner for three years (after adjusting for different rates of voucher take-up in 
each year of the program). However, several cost items are not reported, includ-
ing the deadweight cost of financing the additional governmental expenditure 
of $ 109 per lottery winner, the possible distortionary cost on adult work effort 
in lottery-winning households, and the program’s administrative costs.
TABLE 4
THREE-yEAR COSTS PER LOTTERy WINNER IN THE COLOMBIA 
PACES PROGRAM (US$)




Cost of the vouchers –336 336 0
Deadweight cost of 
government financing ? ?
Effect of voucher on 
adult work effort  ? ?
Administrative costs ? ?
Reduced public 
expenditure on 
secondary schooling 227 227
Additional amount 
spent on schooling by 
lottery winners –236 –236
Opportunity cost of 
student timea –186 –186
Totals –109 –86 0 –195
Source: Angrist, et al. (2003).
a  Estimated on the basis of reported reductions in time worked by lottery winners as compared 
to non-winners.How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 19
Program benefit/cost estimates: The evaluation does not include a formal benefit/
cost analysis, concluding that the benefits clearly exceed the costs using any 
plausible discount rate. However Knowles and Behrman (2004) build on the 
evaluation study results to obtain benefit/cost estimates. A life-cycle approach 
is used with the following assumptions:
•	 The three-year costs of the program include the estimated project costs of 
$ 195 per lottery winner from Table 4 but also administrative and distortionary 
costs of $ 32.65 per lottery winner (i.e., 30% of the increase in government 
expenditure from Table 4)9 and that all program costs occur at ages 13-15 
in equal annual installments.
•	 Lottery winners complete 0.12 additional grades of schooling, with each 
additional grade of schooling resulting in a 10% increase in annual earnings 
of $ 3,000 per year.
•	 Annual benefits occur at ages 16 to 60.
•	 The discount rate is alternatively 3, 5 or 10% per annum, and benefits and 
costs are discounted to age 13.
Under these assumptions, the benefit-cost ratio is 3.8 with a discount rate 
of 3%, 2.7 with a discount rate of 5%, and 2.4 with a discount rate of 10%. The 
discount rate again, as in the pre-school program considered in Section 1.1.1 
and the health and nutrition programs considered in Section 1.2, has a strong 
effect on the estimated benefit/cost ratio because the benefits are spread over 
an extended period of time. Table 5 presents the estimated benefits and costs at 
selected ages for illustrative purposes using a discount rate of 5%. The estimated 
benefits from the increased number of school years completed are presented 
in column 1, while the program’s cost is presented in column 4 (the other col-
umns are discussed below). The calculations show that the benefits are heavily 
discounted (comparing the last two rows of the table).
These estimates of the benefit/cost ratio are conservative, however, not 
only because they assume the lower limit to the estimated gain in the number 
of school grades completed (0.12, as compared to the upper limit of 0.16)10 but 
also because they neglect the other estimated effects of the intervention, i.e., 
the finding that lottery winners were 10% more likely to have completed the 8th 
grade at the time of the evaluation and that they scored 0.2 standard deviations 
higher on standardized tests11.
9  The 30% estimate for administrative and distortionary costs is probably conservative, 
based on the discussion in Knowles and Behrman (2004, Section 3.2.3) where it is recom-
mended that an estimate of 20-25% be used as an estimate of the cost of raising additional 
tax revenue.
10  If the estimated impact of the voucher scheme on the number of school years completed 
is assumed to be 0.16, instead of 0.12, the estimated benefit/cost ratio increases from 2.7 
to 3.6 with a discount rate of 5%.
11  There may be other biases as well that are not explored here. On one hand, the estimate of 
a 10% rate of return to schooling attainment may be upward-biased due to the failure to 
control for unobserved endowments (e.g., innate ability, family connections, motivations) 
in the earnings function estimates. On the other hand, there may be non-labor-market 
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Considering first the effect of the voucher scheme on the age of completing 
the 8th grade, it is assumed that the estimated effect implies that lottery winners 
gain an additional 0.1 year of full-time work at age 15. This additional benefit is 
displayed in row 3, column 2 of Table 5. Like costs, this benefit is only slightly 
discounted because it occurs at age 15. The effect of adding this benefit is to 
increase the estimated benefit-cost ratio from 2.7 to 3.9 (using a discount rate 
of 5%). This is a significant increase, indicating that in the context of economic 
analysis earlier completion of a given grade or level of schooling is an important 
schooling outcome12.
The PACES evaluation study estimates that the increase of 0.2 standard de-
viations in standardized test scores among lottery winners is equivalent to about 
one full additional grade of schooling completed (based on the mean test scores 
by grade of United States Hispanic students taking the same test). If correct, 
this translates into an additional annual earnings benefit of $ 300, compared to 
the previously included annual earnings benefit of $ 36 based on the number of 
additional grades completed. This additional benefit is displayed in column 3 of 
Table 5. Like the benefit associated with the increased number of school grades 
completed, this benefit is heavily discounted because it occurs during the person’s 
entire assumed working life (ages 16-60). Not surprisingly, including this benefit 
increases the estimated benefit/cost ratio dramatically, from 3.9 (including the 
earlier completion benefit and using a discount rate of 5%) to 30.7.
1.1.3.  Argentinean Programa Joven Youth Job Training Program13
Program: The target population of Programa Joven was the large number of poor 
youth, male and female, with limited education and without work experience 
and who were unemployed, under-employed or inactive. The selection criteria 
for the program were minimum age of 16 years, no more than secondary educa-
tion completed, member of a poor household, and not currently employed. The 
program provided intensive training (200 hours over a period of 6 to 12 weeks) 
for positions in the productive sectors of the economy, including reimbursement 
of transportation expenses, a stipend for females with children under 5, medical 
checkups, books, materials, work clothing and an 8-week internship in a firm.
Program benefits: Program impacts were estimated by using propensity score 
matching to compare program participants with one or more “similar” (in terms 
of observed characteristics) non-participants using three different samples/
sources of information:
12  Moreover, its relative importance increases with the discount rate. For example, with a 5% 
discount rate, the earlier completion benefit accounts for 32% of total estimated benefits 
in this example, whereas with a 10% discount rate it accounts for 46% of total estimated 
benefits. Of course the gain from completing a given level of schooling at a younger age 
has been noted in other studies, including the one in Section 1.1.1, going back at least to 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1995).
13  Based on Aedo and Nuñez (2001) as summarized in Knowles and Behrman (2004).Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 22
1.  Administrative data on all individuals who registered and qualified to take 
training programs during the period March 1996 to December 1997 (about 
140,000 persons).
2.  The same administrative data as above but restricted to a sample of 3,340 
individuals consisting of equal numbers of persons extracted from the above 
group in each of the following two groups: 1) persons who completed the 
program training, selected to be representative in terms of sex and region of 
residence, and 2) a “comparison” group of persons who were qualified to 
enter the training programs but who did not participate and who resembled 
those who did participate in terms of age, sex, level of education, labor force 
participation, socioeconomic level and whether they had children under age 
5 years.
3.  Additional survey data available only for the restricted sample of 3,340 
persons in the second data base.
Separate logit functions explaining participation (with participation defined 
as successful completion of the technical knowledge phase of the training) were 
estimated using the three different samples/information sources described above 
to obtain three different sets of propensity scores14. The authors conjectured that 
use of different propensity scores would result in significantly different estimates 
of program impact. The estimation was done separately for: adult males (21-35), 
young males (16-20), adult females (21-35) and young females (16-20) –as well 
as for all four groups combined. The outcome variables considered were earnings 
and employment in the 12th month following completion of the program.
Estimates of program effects on earnings were statistically significant 
only for young males (16-20) and adult females (21-35). For young males, the 
estimated impact of the program on monthly earnings varied from $ 17.17 to 
$ 23.75 depending on the assumptions15. For adult females, the corresponding 
estimates varied from $ 23.40 to $ 32.40. Estimates of the program’s impact on 
monthly earnings for all four groups combined varied from $ 15.67 to $ 22.26. 
Estimates of the program effect on the probability of employment were sta-
tistically significant only for adult females, with the estimated effect varying 
from 0.104 to 0.135. The evaluation study concludes that these differences in 
estimated program impact among groups probably reflect mainly the different 
labor market conditions facing each group.
Program costs: The evaluation study separated the program’s costs into direct 
and indirect components. Direct costs were defined to include the cost of pro-
gram training services provided by competitively-selected providers, the cost of 
employee insurance during the internships, and the cost of stipends provided to 
14  The samples were re-weighted prior to estimation with the sample of 3,340 to correct 
for choice-based sampling (i.e., the fact that the sample was constructed to have equal 
numbers of participants and non-participants).
15  Within the statistically significant groups, the impact estimates were not very sensitive 
either to the sample/information used to estimate the propensity score functions or to the 
number of nearest neighbors used (5,10, 20, or 30). This result was surprising in the case 
of the propensity scores since the three sets of propensity scores were not very highly 
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the trainees (for example, the stipends paid to female participants with children 
under 5)16. The study assumes that the opportunity cost of trainee time is zero, 
which is a strong assumption17. The study also assumes a zero deadweight 
loss for the governmental resources used to fund the program (although a 50% 
deadweight loss is alternatively assumed in sensitivity analysis reported in the 
study). Indirect costs were estimated to be 32.7% of direct costs (with an indirect 
cost ratio of 15% used in sensitivity analysis).
Program benefit/cost estimates: Benefit/cost analysis was done for young males 
and adult females (representing a targeted program) and all four groups combi-
ned (representing the actual program). The estimated effect of the program on 
monthly earnings (the average of the estimates obtained for each group) was 
assumed to be the program’s only benefit and was assumed to remain constant 
during a period of time that was alternatively assumed to last for 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 
15 years or for an unlimited period of time. Two alternative discount rates were 
used (5% and 10%).
In the case of the four groups combined, representing the actual program, the 
estimated net present value of benefits was positive with a discount rate of 5% 
after 12 years (but was still negative with a discount rate of 10% after 15 years).18 
With the analysis restricted to young males and adult females, representing a 
program targeted only to these two groups, the estimated net present benefits 
are positive after 9 years with a discount rate of 5% (or with an indirect cost 
ratio of 15%) and after 12 years with a discount rate of 10%. If a deadweight 
loss of 50% of the program’s total expenditure is assumed as the distortionary 
cost of governmental financing, estimated net present benefits of the existing 
program are non-positive after 15 years, even with a discount rate of 5%, while 
for a targeted program (i.e., one restricted to young males and adult females), 
they are positive only after 15 years with a discount rate of 5% (but only when 
an unlimited time period is assumed with a discount rate of 10%).
1.2.  Human Capital Investments to Reduce Hunger and Malnutrition
Behrman, Alderman and Hoddinott (2004) present benefit/cost ratios for four 
sets of interventions related to hunger and malnutrition in a low-income country 
context, based on extensive discussion of the available information with which 
to assess benefits and costs and the sensitivity of the estimates to different as-
sumptions. This was part of the “Copenhagen Consensus” in which a panel of 
eight distinguished economists, including four Nobel Laureates, ranked about 
40 projects in ten broad topic areas on the basis in part of benefit/cost analyses 
16  This last category is actually a transfer and should not have been included in the program 
resource costs.
17  Presumably, many of the trainees would have been employed in the informal sector or in 
housework if they had not participated in the program. This assumption also implicitly 
assumes that interns did not contribute positively to the output of the firms in which they 
were working for 8 weeks.
18  However, with an indirect cost rate of 15% estimated net present benefits were positive 
after 15 years even with a discount rate of 10%. In addition, under the basic assumptions 
used, the program had estimated positive net benefits over an infinite time period.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 24
prepared by experts in each of the areas (Lomborg 2004). In the final ranking of 
the alternatives projects related to hunger and malnutrition were highly ranked 
in terms of priorities.
Here, I present new estimates based on a similar approach, but using prices 
and incomes for the LAC 2005 average19, Brazilian survival probabilities20 and 
alternative means of valuing adverted mortality in terms of the value placed on 
value per DALy (Disability Adjusted Life years) of $1,000 (“low”) and $ 5,000 
(“high”), which are the values suggested by the Copenhagen Consensus for new 
estimates in initial Problem Papers for a 2008 Copenhagen Consensus exercise21. 
I consider three sets of nutritional interventions:
Reducing the Prevalence of low birth weight (LBW): Many of the 12 million LBW 
infants born each year die at young ages, contributing significantly to neonatal 
mortality, which makes up the largest proportion of infant mortality in many 
developing countries. Unfortunately, rates of LBW have remained relatively 
static in recent decades. Because LBW infants are 40% more likely to die in 
the neonatal period than their normal weight counterparts, addressing LBW is 
essential to achieve reductions in infant mortality. Moreover, many of the LBW 
children who survive infancy suffer cognitive and neurological impairment and 
are stunted as adolescents and adults. Thus, in addition to contributing to excess 
mortality, LBW is associated with lower productivity in a range of economic 
and other activities. LBW also may be important in light of new evidence that 
shows that LBW infants may have an increased risk of cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes and hypertension later in life. LBW may also be an intergenerational 
problem because LBW girls who survive tend to be undernourished when preg-
nant with relatively high incidence of LBW children. While the prevalence of 
LBW is particularly high in South Asia, there are substantial numbers of LBW 
babies in other parts of the developing world, including in LAC.
The benefits from reducing LBW encompass the PDV of the six impacts 
over the lifecycle and the one across generations that are summarized in the 
previous paragraph. Under the assumptions used here, the most important effects 
are from adverting mortality (11 to 50% of the total), intergeneration effects 
(18-39%), chronic diseases (8-38%), and productivity (6-27%). Note that these 
relative contributions differ a lot depending on the discount rates (5% or 10%) 
and the DALyS ($ 1,000 or $ 5,000). The higher the discount rate, the more 
19  In particular, I use the Gross National Income per capita (Atlas method) of $4008 for Latin 
America in 2005 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0 
(24 November 2006) relative to the $ 500 value for the target population in a context such 
as South Asia in Behrman, Alderman and Hoddinott (2004) to adjust all the prices and 
incomes in that study for the present purpose. 
20  Survival probabilities are relevant since some impacts occur only if the individual affected 
by the intervention lives long enough. The source used is the WHO Life Table for Brazil 
at http://www.who.int/countries as of 24 November 2006.
21  In Behrman, Alderman and Hoddinott (2004) for our preferred estimates we followed 
Summers (1992, 1994) and used instead of DALys at such levels, the alternative resource 
cost that these societies had chosen to allocate to advert an infant mortality, which was 
estimated to be $ 1250 in PDV terms (from inoculations) –a much lower value than implied 
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important is adverting infant mortality (and to a lesser extent, neonatal and infant 
illnesses). The larger the DALyS, the more important is the effect on chronic 
diseases, as well of adverting infant mortality. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the 
benefits and costs for three interventions to reduce LBW. The benefit-to-cost 
ratios range from 2.5 to 292.6 –with higher values for the “low” (5%) discount 
rate, the “high” DALy ($ 5,000) and the intervention of providing drugs for 
pregnant women with poor obstetric histories.
Improving Infant and Child Nutrition: The nutritional literature emphasizes 
that undernutrition is most common and severe during periods of greatest vul-
nerability (Martorell 1997, UNICEF 1998). One such period is in utero, that is 
addressed above with regard to LBW. A second vulnerable period is the first two 
years or so of life. young children have high nutritional requirements, in part 
because they are growing so fast. Unfortunately, the diets commonly offered to 
young children in developing countries to complement breast milk are of low 
quality (i.e., with low energy and nutrient density), and as a result, multiple 
nutrient deficiencies are common. young children are also very susceptible to 
infections because their immune systems are both developmentally immature 
and compromised by poor nutrition. In poor countries, foods and liquids are 
often contaminated and are thus key sources of frequent infections that both 
reduce appetite and increase metabolic demands. Furthermore, in many societies, 
suboptimal traditional remedies for childhood infections, including withholding 
of foods and breast milk, are common. Thus infection and malnutrition reinforce 
each other. Improving the nutrition of infants and young children has effects 
at most points of the life cycle described above (except for reduced neonatal 
care and reduced costs of chronic diseases associated with LBW). While the 
prevalence of stunting is relatively high in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
there is considerable stunting in other parts of the developing world including 
LAC. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the benefits and costs for two interventions to 
reduce stunting. The benefit/cost ratios range from 25.6 to 930.3 –with higher 
values for the “low” (5%) discount rate, the “high” DALy ($ 5,000) and the 
intervention of breastfeeding promotion in hospitals.
Reducing the Prevalence of Iron, Iodine and Vitamin A Deficiencies: Deficiencies in 
iron, iodine, and Vitamin A all have both immediate and long-term consequences. 
Iodine deficiency adversely affects development of the central nervous system and 
individuals with an iodine deficiency have, on average, lower IQs. Approximately 
2 billion people are affected by iodine deficiency including 285 million children 
aged 6 to 12 years. Adequate iron intake is also necessary for brain development. 
More than 40% of children age 0-4 years in developing countries suffer from 
anemia; further anemia in school-age children may also affect schooling whether 
or not there had been earlier impaired brain development. Vitamin A deficiencies, 
which are estimated to affect 140 million pre-school children, are associated 
with increased risk of infant and child mortality. Some of these micronutrient 
deficiencies are considerable in LAC. Lessening these micronutrient deficiencies 
has effects at most points of the life cycle noted above. Tables 6 and 7 summarize 
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from 46.8 to 15,469 –with higher values for the “low” (5%) discount rate, the 
“high” DALy ($ 5,000) and for the provision of iodine.
1.3.  Summary of Benefit/Cost Estimates for Human Capital 
Interventions in LAC
To my knowledge, there are but a limited number of benefit/cost estimates 
for human capital interventions in LAC or even more broadly in the developing 
world, and a number of the estimates that do exist have problems with inter-
pretation because, for example, the definition of benefits used is very limited 
or confounding resource costs with transfers or other estimation problems. The 
selected survey of benefit/cost estimates in this section includes studies that 
probably are better than most others in regard to the many estimation issues, but 
still have their flaws, as noted. And they appear quite sensitive to some critical 
assumptions, particularly regarding the appropriate discount rate and the value 
of adverting mortality (or increasing the number of healthy years of life). In a 
number of cases for the nutritional interventions, moreover, the benefit/cost ratios 
are so high as to strain credibility. If benefit/cost ratios are anywhere near this 
high, how is it possible that such opportunities have been bypassed? Part of the 
answer to this question may relate to the underlying estimates of impacts and 
costs (e.g., is scaling-up really captured adequately?) or to, particularly in the 
general LAC context and probably even more so for Chile in particular, there 
being only relatively small and dispersed groups for which the deficiencies exist 
for which the returns are high. Nevertheless, despite all their warts and flaws, 
the benefit/cost ratios reviewed suggest that even if these estimates might be 
high, there are likely to be some attractive human capital-related interventions 
in LAC more generally and in Chile in particular.
2.  Schooling Attainment and Earnings Distribution in the 2004 
Chilean Social Protection Survey
Given the qualified, but nevertheless definitely positive assessment of a number 
of human capital-related interventions from the selected review in Section 1, it 
is of interest in the context of this volume to ask what would be the impact on 
the income distribution were there have been some targeted increases in human 
capital. The review in Section 1 would seem to suggest that some of these ef-
fects might be considerable. Therefore I explore this question in this section by 
simulating impacts of hypothetical changes in schooling attainment in Chile. I 
focus on schooling attainment because it is the most-emphasized among human 
capital investments –indeed many studies empirically seem to equate schooling 
attainment with human capital. I focus on Chile not only because it is the focus 
of this volume and but also because I am involved, with some other colleagues 
in collection and analysis of the Chilean Social Protection Survey (SPS) that is 
described in more detail in Appendix A. The purpose of this exercise, however, 
is not so much to describe real-world policy options for Chile, but to use the SPS 
to generate some illustrative simulations about the impact of changed human 
capital distributions on the earnings distributions –and to calculate suggestive 
orders of magnitude of the effects.How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 29
Basic description of inequality and “poverty” in the 2004 Chilean SPS: Table 8 
summarizes some relevant sample-weighted statistics from the 2004 SPS regarding 
the distribution of schooling attainment, labor market earnings, and wage rates 
per hour for the 51,244 adults age 21 years or older for whom this information 
all is available. As is well-known, average schooling attainment levels in Chile 
are relatively high in comparison with many developing countries, including 
a number of others in LAC. These estimates suggest that the distribution of 
schooling attainment also is relatively equal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.23, in 
comparison numbers reported for other countries in LAC (Table 1)22. Almost a 
fifth of the sample (18%) had schooling attainment below six grades, and about 
three tenths had schooling attainment below eight grades.
TABLE 8
CHILEAN 2004 SPS, BASIC STATISTICS FOR SCHOOLING, EARNINGS AND WAGE 















Schooling Attainment 9.5 0.23 0.18 0.30
(Grades) 4.3 0.001 0.002 0.002
Earnings  2149 0.53 0.20 0.36
(1000 Pesos per year) 3195 0.003 0.002 0.002
Wage Rate 1193 0.49 0.17 0.33
  (Pesos per hour) 1751 0.004 0.002 0.002
*  The “low” and “higher” poverty lines for schooling are < 6 and < 8 grades, for earnings < 500000 
and < 1000000 pesos per year, and for wages < 400 and < 600 pesos per hour. The standard 
errors for the Gini coefficients are calculated by bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. All estimates 
are weighted to reflect the sample design.
The 2004 SPS earnings Gini coefficient is 0.53, significantly below the value 
for Chile given in Table 1 for around 2000 and at about the mean for LAC in that 
table. The 2004 wage rate Gini coefficient is somewhat lower at 0.49, suggesting 
that some of the inequality in actual earnings income is due to choices of those 
who have higher market wage rates to spend more time working. Therefore the 
Gini coefficient for the wage rate or, equivalently, for full income, is somewhat 
lower. For both earnings and the wage rate I define “low” and “higher” “poverty” 
cutoffs. These are not related to any official or unofficial efforts to define poverty 
consumption baskets in any meaningful way, for which reason I put “poverty” 
in quotation marks here. They are just convenient benchmarks at rounded values 
of pesos per year and per hour, respectively, that demarcate the points below 
which in the 2004 SPS distribution there are about a fifth (0.20 for earnings, 
22  Including the Gini coefficient reported for Chile in 2000 in Table 1. I do not have an 
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0.17 for the wage rate) and about a third (0.36 for earnings, 0.33 for the wage 
rate) of the individuals with positive earnings and wage rates.
Semilog earnings and wage rate functions based on the 2004 SPS: To be able 
to simulate how different hypothetical patterns of schooling attainment would 
affect the earnings and wage rate distributions, I need estimates of these relations. 
Of course there is considerable controversy about how best to estimate these 
relations and to what extent and in what direction OLS estimates are biased 
(e.g., Card 1999, Behrman and Rosenzweig 1999). For the illustrative purposes 
here, I nevertheless use OLS estimates, with splines in schooling to allow for 
nonlinearities with differential returns to the first six grades (“primary”) versus 
the second six grades (“secondary”) versus more than 12 grades (“tertiary”). 
I also include a quadratic in potential work experience (age-schooling attain-
ment – six) and allow for all the coefficient estimates to differ between males 
and females.
Table 9 summarizes the resulting estimates. The first two rows of coefficient 
estimates refer to the semilog earnings function and the second two rows refer 
to the semilog wage rate function, with t values in italics beneath each point 
estimate. Within each pair of rows, the first row gives the estimates for females 
and the second row gives the extent to which the point estimate for males differs 
significantly (at the 5% level) if it does.
TABLE 9
WEIGHTED SEMI-LOG EARNINGS AND WAGE FUNCTIONS FOR 51,244 ADULTS 
AGE 21+ IN 2004 CHILEAN SPS*
    Spline in Schooling Pot Experience Const R sq
    Prim Sec Ter Level Square   F
ln Earnings 0.040 0.102 0.235 0.040 –0.00048 12.412 0.201
5.31 22.90 36.69 28.79 –22.50 286.00 1009
xMale 0.036 0.015 –0.038 0.169
4.16 2.84 –4.20 4.05
ln Wage 0.039 0.104 0.227 0.022 –0.00030 5.481 0.339
9.06 49.16 77.89 21.37 –16.44 220.08 2810
xMale 0.041
    30.42            
*  t-statistics in italics beneath coefficient estimates; potential experience is age –schooling attain-
ment– 6; the row with “xMale” includes all significant coefficients for the interaction between 
“male” and the right-side variable in that column.
Overall the semilog earnings function is consistent with about a fifth of the 
sample variance and the semilog wage rate function is consistent with about a 
third of the sample variance. That means, of course, that there are considerable How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 31
shares of the variance that are not affected by schooling attainment –four-fifths 
for ln earnings and two-thirds for ln wage rates. The quadratics in experience 
are highly significant, and suggest an increasing impact at a diminishing rate 
of experience with no significant differences between females and males. The 
schooling coefficient estimates also are highly significant and also suggest strong 
nonlinearities, with much larger effects for an additional grade of tertiary school 
attainment than for an additional grade of secondary school attainment and a 
much larger effect for an additional grade of secondary school attainment than 
for an additional grade of primary school attainment. Males have an estimated 
16.9% greater earnings independent of schooling attainment and potential ex-
perience, and have significantly higher schooling coefficients for both primary 
and secondary schooling, though females have a significantly higher coefficient 
for tertiary schooling in the ln earnings function. However, except for the higher 
coefficient for males for primary schooling, the gender differences in the ln earn-
ings function estimates basically reflect gender differences in hours worked in 
the paid labor force. Therefore, with the exception again of primary schooling, 
there are no significant gender differences in the ln wage rate function.
Simulations of the impact of alternative targeted schooling attainment increases 
on inequality and poverty: Table 10 summarizes eight simulations of the impact 
of alternative targeted changes in schooling attainment on Gini coefficients for 
inequality and the low and higher poverty cutoff headcounts for earnings and 
for wage rates. These simulations assume that the semilog earnings and wage 
rate relations in Table 9 hold. That is, they assume that the coefficient estimates 
are unbiased estimates of the true causal effects of schooling attainment on ln 
earnings and ln wages23, that none of the simulation interventions is so large to 
change the relevant coefficients, and that each individual receives the same shock 
(i.e., has the same residual) as in the estimates in Table 924. The Gini coefficients 
and the poverty headcount measures are in bold, with the standard errors to the 
right in italics. Note that the standard errors generally are small relative to the 
simulated changes, so the simulated changes generally are significant.
At the top of Table 10 the Gini coefficient estimates and poverty headcounts 
for the base data are given, as in Table 8, for easy reference. The question of 
interest is how much do each of the alternative simulations differ from these 
base values. The eight simulations that are included in the table are:
23  That is, that there are not omitted variable biases because these estimates do not control 
for unobserved ability and other aspects of family background and for school quality, 
though some available estimates suggest that the failure to control for such factors may 
result in substantial overestimates of the impact of schooling attainment because schooling 
attainment partially is proxying for individual and family background and school quality 
(e.g., Behrman and Birdsall (1983), Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999)). An alternative 
interpretation of the simulations with regard to school quality is that the underlying assump-
tion is that school quality is positive correlated with schooling attainment (as suggested 
by the modeling and the empirical results in Behrman and Birdsall (1983)) and that in 
the simulations schooling quality is being increased together with schooling attainment 
in order to maintain the association between the two that exists in the sample data. 
24  From one cross-section one can not identify whether these are transitory or permanent 
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1.  Increasing schooling attainment by one grade for all individuals whose wage 
rate is below 400 Pesos per hour in the SPS.
2.  Increasing schooling attainment by three grades for all individuals whose 
wage rate is below 400 Pesos per hour in the SPS.
3.  Increasing schooling attainment by five grades for all individuals whose 
wage rate is below 400 Pesos per hour in the SPS.
4.  Increasing schooling attainment by three grades for all individuals whose 
wage rate is below 600 Pesos per hour in the SPS.
5.  Increasing schooling attainment by three grades for all individuals whose 
schooling attainment is equal to or below six grades in the SPS.
6.  Increasing schooling attainment by three grades for all individuals whose 
schooling attainment is equal to or below nine grades in the SPS.
7.  Increasing schooling attainment to six grades for all individuals whose 
schooling is below six grades in the SPS.
8.  Increasing schooling attainment to nine grades for all individuals whose 
schooling is below nine grades in the SPS.
The first four simulations each have increases in schooling attainment for 
individuals who are low in the wage rate distribution. The second set of four 
simulations each have increases in schooling attainment for individuals low in 
the schooling distribution.
Of course these eight simulations differ, perhaps substantially, with regard 
to the resource costs of the changes in schooling attainment that are considered. 
This is indicated by the column in Table 10 titled “Added School Grades” which 
gives the number of added school grades per 100 representative people that 
would be required for each simulation. In simulation 1, for example, the 17% 
of the population with wage rates below 400 pesos per hour are given one more 
grade of school, so 17 added school grades are needed per 100 people – and in 
simulation 2 since the same individuals are given three more school grades each, 
51 added school grades are needed per 100 people. Under the assumption that 
the cost per added grade of school attained is the same for all grades of primary 
and secondary school for all people whatever their actual schooling and that the 
inequality and poverty measures also are approximately linear over small ranges, 
the changes in Gini coefficients and in poverty headcounts can be standardized 
by the added school grades to obtain the changes in Gini coefficients and in 
poverty headcounts across the eight simulations (each in comparison with the 
baseline) relative to the same costs in terms of schooling attainment. Table 11 
presents these estimates, which are more informative than are those in Table 10 
because of the control for costs across alternatives.
Some observations that come out of this exercise include:
Schooling inequality: With the exception of simulation 1, these simulations reduce 
the Gini coefficient for schooling. These reductions are much larger (about twice 
as large) for the simulations targeted towards those with low schooling (i.e., 
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TABLE 11
SIMULATIONS OF IMPACTS OF CHANGED SCHOOLING DISTRIBUTION ON 
INEQUALITy AND POVERTy HEADCOUNT MEASURES, NORMALIzED By 
REQUIRED SCHOOL GRADE INCREASES, BASED ON 2004 CHILEAN SPS*
  Simulation   Gini Poverty Headcount
Schooling Change Target Pop Coefficient “Low”  “Higher” 
1 1 grade wage <400 Schooling 0.01 –0.07 –0.04
Earnings –0.03 –0.08 –0.07
Wage Rates –0.03 –0.11 0.00
2 3 grades wage<400 Schooling –0.03 –0.08 –0.09
Earnings –0.03 –0.05 –0.06
Wage Rates –0.03 –0.12 –0.02
3 5 grades wage <400 Schooling –0.03 –0.07 –0.09
Earnings –0.03 –0.05 –0.07
Wage Rates –0.04 –0.11 –0.06
4 3 grades wage <600 Schooling –0.03 –0.07 –0.08
Earnings –0.03 –0.03 –0.06
Wage Rates –0.04 –0.06 –0.14
5 3 grades sch <=6 Schooling –0.07 –0.15 –0.15
Earnings –0.01 –0.02 –0.03
Wage Rates –0.01 –0.03 –0.04
6 3 grades sch <=9 Schooling –0.06 –0.09 –0.11
Earnings –0.02 –0.02 –0.04
Wage Rates –0.02 –0.03 –0.05
7 to 6 grades sch < 6 Schooling –0.08 –0.33 0.00
Earnings –0.01 –0.02 –0.03
Wage Rates –0.02 –0.03 –0.03
8 to 9 grades sch < 9 Schooling –0.06 –0.09 –0.14
Earnings –0.01 –0.02 –0.03
      Wage Rates –0.01 –0.02 –0.03
*  Based on the estimates in Table 10, normalized by the required additional grades of schooling for each 
simulation that are given in that table. The “low” and “higher” poverty lines for schooling are < 6 and < 8 
grades, for earnings < 500000 and < 1000000 pesos per year, and for wages < 400 and < 600 pesos per 
hour.
simulations 1-4). This pattern emphasizes the point that while schooling attainment 
and wage rates (and earnings) are positively correlated, the correlations are far 
from one25. The normalized changes in the Gini coefficients for schooling are 
from 0.01 to –0.03 for the four simulations with low wage rates targeted and are 
from –0.06 to –0.08 for the four simulations with low schooling targeted. The 
largest simulated decline of –0.08 is for bringing all with less than six grades 
of completed schooling up to six grades of schooling attainment. In order to 
reduce schooling inequality, hardly surprisingly, the most effective policy is to 
focus on those in the left-hand part of the schooling distribution26.
25  The correlations are 0.36 between schooling attainment and either the wage rate or earn-
ings. The correlation between the wage rate and earnings is 0.80.
26  If the cost per added schooling grade attainment increases with schooling levels (e.g., 
is higher for secondary than for primary school), then the relative advantage in terms of 
reducing schooling inequality of focusing on the left-hand tail of the schooling distribution 
is even greater than indicated by these simulations.How much might human capital policies… / Jere R. Behrman 35
Schooling “poverty” headcounts: The same general point holds, also not sur-
prisingly, for the schooling poverty headcounts. For the simulations targeted 
towards those with low wage rates, the proportion of the population below the 
“low” cutoff of six grades of attained school drop by –0.07 or –0.08 and the 
proportion below the “higher” cutoff of eight grades drops by from –0.04 to 
–0.09. For the simulations targeted towards those with low schooling attainment, 
the proportion of the population below the “low” cutoff of six grades of attained 
school drop by –0.09 to –0.3327 and the proportion below the “higher” cutoff of 
eight grades drops by from 0.00 to –0.15. Notice, however, that there is a nuance. 
Policies targeted toward increasing schooling only below the “low” cutoff (e.g., 
simulation 7) reduce the proportion below the “high” cutoff less (by 0.0 in this 
case) than policies directed towards increasing the schooling attainment of those 
with low wage rates (simulations 1-4).
Earnings inequality: All of these simulations reduce the Gini coefficient for 
earnings. These reductions are much larger (from 1.5 to three times as large) for 
the simulations targeted towards those with low wage rates (i.e., simulations 1-4) 
rather than those targeted to those with low schooling attainment (i.e., simulations 
5-8). This pattern again reinforces the point that while schooling attainment and 
wage rates (and earnings) are positively correlated, the correlations are far from 
one. The normalized changes in the Gini coefficients for earnings are –0.03 for 
the four simulations with low wage rates targeted and are –0.01 to –0.02 for the 
four simulations with low schooling targeted. If the goal were only to reduce 
earnings inequality, thus, it would be desirable to target effectively those with 
low wage rates28 but in terms of this criterion alone it does not matter which of 
the four alternatives considered with low wage rate targeting (simulations 1-4) is 
used (though it does matter for other possible objectives such as lowering those 
below poverty cutoffs). Of course how to target those with low wage rates for 
interventions to increase schooling attainment is a tricker question than how to 
target those with low schooling given the concentration of schooling in childhood 
and youth and that wage outcomes are revealed only later in the life cycle.
Earnings “poverty” headcounts: The same general point again holds, not 
surprisingly, for the earnings poverty headcounts. For the simulations targeted 
towards those with low wage rates, the proportion of the population below the 
“low” cutoff of 500000 pesos per year drop by from –0.03 to –0.08 and the 
proportion below the “higher” cutoff of 1000000 pesos per year drops by from 
–0.06 to –0.07. For the simulations targeted towards those with low schooling 
attainment, the proportion of the population below the “low” cutoff of 500000 
27  That this drop is greater than the 0.18 in the base simulation is because of the normaliza-
tion. Obviously this policy could be pursued only to the point at which the proportion 
below the cutoff became 0.
28  To keep the number of simulations discussed to a reasonable limit, I do not present simu-
lations that target low earnings; these are somewhat more effective than targeting low 
wage rate recipients in reducing earnings inequality, but the difference is not as great as 
between targeting low wage recipients versus those with low schooling (given the much 
higher correlation between earnings and wage rates noted above than between either and 
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pesos per year drop by –0.02 and the proportion below the “higher” cutoff of 
1000000 pesos per year drops by from –0.03 to –0.04. Though all four of the 
simulations directed towards low wage rate recipients have the same impact on 
reducing the earnings Gini coefficient, they differ a fair amount with respect 
to their impacts on the proportions below the poverty cutoffs. In particular in-
creasing schooling attainment by one grade for all those with wage rates below 
400 Pesos per hour is simulated to reduce the normalized proportion below the 
“low” poverty cutoff of 500000 pesos per year by –0.08 (simulation 1), while at 
the other extreme among the first four simulations, increasing schooling attain-
ment by three grades for all those with wage rates below 600 pesos per hour is 
simulated to reduce the normalized proportion below the same “low” poverty 
cutoff by only –0.03 (simulation 4). This is an interesting illustration of why it 
is important not to presume that reducing inequality and reducing poverty are 
sufficiently similar objectives that they lead to the same policy priorities.
Wage rate inequality: All of these simulations reduce the Gini coefficients for 
wage rates at least as much or slightly more (i.e., by an additional –0.01 in three 
of the eight simulations) than for earnings. That the simulations, if anything, are 
slightly more effective for reducing wage rate than earnings inequalities reflects 
that the simulations presented are targeted towards low wage rates rather than low 
earnings but that the differences are not all that great reflects the relatively high 
correlation between earnings and wage rates. As for earnings, these reductions 
are much larger (from 1.5 to four times as large) for the simulations targeted 
towards those with low wage rates (i.e., simulations 1-4) rather than those targeted 
to those with low schooling attainment (i.e., simulations 5-8). The normalized 
changes in the Gini coefficients for wage rates are –0.03 to –0.04 for the four 
simulations with low wage rates targeted and are –0.01 to –0.02 for the four 
simulations with low schooling targeted. If the goal were only to reduce wage 
rate or full income inequality, thus, it would be desirable to target effectively 
those with low wage rates. The question of how to target those with low wage 
rates for interventions to increase schooling attainment, of course, remains a 
challenge given life-cycle schooling-earnings sequencing patterns.
Wage rate “poverty” headcounts: The same general point again holds, again not 
surprisingly, for the wage rate poverty headcounts. For the simulations targeted 
towards those with low wage rates, the proportion of the population below the 
“low” cutoff of 400 pesos per hour drop by –0.06 to –0.12 and the proportion 
below the “higher” cutoff of 600 pesos per hour drops by from –0.00 to –0.14. 
For the simulations targeted towards those with low schooling attainment, the 
proportion of the population below the “low” cutoff of 400 pesos per hour drop 
by –0.02 to –0.03 and the proportion below the “higher” cutoff of 1000000 pesos 
per year drops by from –0.03 to –0.05. Though all four of the simulations directed 
towards low wage rate recipients have about the same impact on reducing the 
wage rate Gini coefficient, they differ a fair amount with respect to their impacts 
on the proportions below the poverty cutoffs. In particular increasing schooling 
attainment alone for those with wage rates below 400 pesos per hour is simula-
ted to reduce the normalized proportion below the “low” poverty cutoff of 400 
pesos per hour by –0.11 or –0.12 (simulations 1-3), while increasing schooling 
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hour is simulated to reduce the normalized proportion below the same “low” 
poverty cutoff by only about half as much at –0.06 (simulation 4). On the other 
hand the latter simulation is much more effective at reducing the proportion 
below the “higher” poverty cutoff of 600 pesos per hour (by –0.14) than the 
first three simulations (from 0.00 to –0.06). This is an interesting illustration of 
how sensitive policy effectiveness rankings might be to which part of the lower 
end of the wage rate distribution is of interest29.
3.  Conclusions
Human resource investments targeted towards the lower part of wage rate, 
earnings or income distributions are often thought to be major means through 
which the persistent high LAC inequalities in general, including those in Chile, 
might effectively be addressed, with concomitant effects of reducing poverty.
Previous and new benefit/cost estimates for a range of human resource invest-
ments pertaining to different aspects of education and health/nutrition, though 
subject to a number of caveats because of the problems in making such estimates 
and their sensitivity to alternative assumptions such as regarding discount rates 
and the value of adverting mortality, suggest that there are likely to be a number 
of high rate-of-return options for such investments in LAC. These include dif-
ferent dimensions of education, including pre- and post-school experiences and 
not just schooling, and a number of possibly higher rate-of-return interventions 
in health/nutrition. These estimates suggest that there are opportunities that LAC 
governments should evaluate in their own particular contexts, including the 
extent of the subpopulations for which deficits are important and the nature of 
delivery mechanisms. This is likely to lead to some high rate-of-return options 
for human resource interventions.
Will such human resource interventions, if well-targeted, reduce substan-
tially inequality in the and poverty region? To partially explore this question, 
the Chilean 2004 SPS data are used to examine the impact of schooling attain-
ment, the most emphasized human capital investment (and one through which 
in important part other interventions such as those related to early childhood 
health and nutrition may work), using wage rate and earnings functions that 
probably are optimistic about the impact of schooling (because they ignore 
such factors as ability bias and market-level effects). Alternative simulations 
suggest significant impacts of well-targeted increases in schooling attainment 
on reducing inequality and poverty headcounts in schooling, earnings, and wage 
rates. They also illustrate the desirability of targeting directly towards the out-
come of interest (e.g., towards those with low wage rates, not low schooling, if 
full income is of primary concern) despite the possible difficulties in doing so 
(since wage experiences typically are not revealed until after most people have 
29  This point is closely related, of course, to the question of what poverty measure to use – 
i.e., headcount versus poverty gap versus poverty depth measures within the Foster, Greer 
and Thorbecke (1984) measures. For simplicity in this paper I present only the headcount 
measures, though as part of the analysis for the paper all three of the measures have been 
simulated. Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 38
finished their schooling), the possible complementarities and tradeoffs between 
reducing inequality and reducing poverty, that policies with the same impact 
on inequality may have very different effects on poverty, and that the poverty 
impact may depend importantly on what part of the lower end of distributions 
is of interest. But, though the magnitudes of some of the simulated impacts on 
the poverty headcounts are fairly large, the magnitudes of the reductions in the 
Gini coefficient estimates for earnings and for wage rates are not very large 
even though the simulated changes in schooling attainment are considerable. Of 
course the benefit/cost ratios suggest that some other human capital interventions 
may have higher rates of return than increasing schooling attainment, and this 
may carryover to greater impacts on inequality and on poverty. But all in all it 
would seem that these simulations suggest that while there is significant scope 
for reducing inequality and probably somewhat more poverty through human 
capital interventions, expectations should not be for massive changes through 
these mechanisms alone unless there really are massive improvements in the 
human capital of the poorer members of society.
APPEnDIx A
The Chilean Social Protection Survey
In 2002, the Microdata Center of the Department of Economics of the 
Universidad de Chile under the Directorship of David Bravo conducted a new 
household survey (2002 EPS, Encuesta de Protección Social, or Social Protection 
Survey). This is a very valuable research asset providing researchers a host of 
useful new individual-level information for addressing numerous research ques-
tions – information that previously was unavailable30. The interview sample was 
drawn from a sampling frame of approximately 8.1 million current and former 
affiliates of the Chilean old-age systems compiled from official databases obtained 
from the Chilean Ministry of Labor and Social Security; the frame included 
about three-quarters of the population age 15+ in 2001. The survey was fielded 
between April and December of 2002, collecting data from individuals who were 
working, unemployed, out of the labor force, receiving pensions, or deceased 
(in the latter case, information was collected from surviving relatives).
The 2002 EPS survey included socio-demographic information and current 
labor market data for each member of the household, detailed information about 
receipt of pensions and types of pension plan participation and retrospective labor 
market history going back to 1980. The 2002 survey contains data on 17,246 
respondents (937 of them were reports by surviving relatives) affiliated with 
30  The 2002 survey was initially called the 2002 History of Labor and Social Security (HLSS, 
Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social) survey. But the follow-up 2004, 2006 and 2009 
longitudinal surveys are called Social Protection Surveys (SPS, Encuesta de Protección 
Social). The interested reader is referred to http://www.proteccionsocial.cl for access to 
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the old or the new retirement system for at least one month at any time during 
the 1981-2001 time span31.
Another round of the survey was administered in 2004, which included a 
second wave for previously surveyed respondents, plus new surveys for a sub-
sample of individuals not affiliated with the social security system (individuals 
never employed in the formal sector) and also a subsample of new entrants into 
the AFP system between 2002 and 2004. In addition a host of new health and 
wealth questions were introduced for the first time32. Accordingly, the 2004 
survey is representative of the entire Chilean population33. Furthermore in 2004, 
the research project received permission to merge responses to the sampled 
respondents with administrative records on pension contributions and earnings 
in the PAyGO and AFP systems since 1980, data on the amounts of recogni-
tion bonds; and monthly data on account changes in the individual investment 
accounts, switches between AFPs, AFP commissions charged, and investment 
returns earned on all accounts in the AFP system. The survey data has also been 
merged with monthly Social Security records, available since 198134. The 2004 
EPS was the last round available when this paper was written for the December 
2006 workshop.
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